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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Sugar is one of the commodities that attract a lot of 
public interest. It can be regarded as providing two 
distinct service s- as a source of energy and as a s wee tener. 
Sugar can be produced in both temperate and tropical 
climates. Moreover, it is an agricultural product which has 
one of the most fluctuating prices of all commodities in the 
world agricultural trade. This study is an attempt to apply 
opti mal storage rules to the international sugar trade and 
to examine the effect of this rule on t he sugar export 
earnings of eight majo r exporting regions in the free 
market . 
This thesis consists of five chapters . Chapter 1 shows 
the objective of this study and the structure of the 
international sugar trade. In this chapter a review of 
related literatures on the international sugar market is 
included. Chapter 2 discusses the theory of price 
stabi l ization. A simple model is derived to show the 
general idea of applying price stabilization theory. The 
quantitative results and discussion of applying the optimal 
storage rule are reported in Chapters 3 and 4. In those 
chapters an econometric model of demand and supply functions 
is estimated. The final chapter summarizes the effect of 
price stabilization on the international sugar trade. 
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The purpose of this study is to find out the effect of 
price stabilization by buffer stocks on 
1. The level of sugar export earnings of major sugar 
exporters . 
2. The variability of sugar export earnings. 
The buffer stocks in this study are managed under the 
optimal storage rule or the competitive rule. The export 
earning of eight major exporting regions in the free market 
are studied. The total exports from these regions comprises 
about 70-80 percent of the international sugar trade. 
These regions are Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the EEC, 
Dominican Republic, the Philippines, South Africa, and 
Thailand . 
The World Sugar Market 
Sugar is usually produced from sugar cane in the 
tropical regions and from sugar beet in the temperate 
regions of the world. Sugar was originally produced for 
local consumption and more recently for export earnings. 
Sugar has been traded internationally since around the 
10-th century (19) . In the early stage of the world sugar 
trade, there was little political intervention. Trade took 
place in the free market . After World War I, various 
policies were adopted to increase domestic and colonial 
countries' sugar production. These policies placed wo rld 
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sugar trade under special agreement between mother countries 
and their colonies. World trade was inevitably divided into 
trade within the preferential market or outside the free 
market, and trade within the free market. By this division 
under the special agreement, sugar became a •political 
commodity• <45). 
The Preferential Market (12 and 45) 
In the international sugar trade, there is some amount 
of sugar which has been under special agreements. The 
purpose of these agreements is to provide a sufficient 
amount of sugar for consumption in specific areas. Not only 
do the consuming countries gain, but the preferential market 
also benefits the exporters by giving them some certain 
regions for exports. In trading in this market, generally, 
the importing countries pay some premium over the price in 
the free market. The important preferential markets are now 
briefly considered as follows. 
1. The US Market 
The sources of sugar supply to the US mapket are 
A. Continental domestic production. 
B. Internal imports from the US offshore producing 
area, i.e., Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands. 
C. Imports from foreign countries. 
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The major foreign countries exporting to the US market 
are the Philippines, Brazi l and Taiwa n . However, th is 
market has been influenced by the US government . Before 
1934, the import of sugar from foreign countries wa s 
influenced by the tariff system. Since then, this marke t 
was regulated by the US Sugar Act (the Jones - Costigan Ac t ) . 
The Act had a primary objective to protect domestic sugar 
producers by setting up a quota import system. As price in 
the US market usually exceeded the free market price, the 
protection also favored the foreign suppliers. The US sugar 
market has been under legislation for forty years. The Act 
was terminated by the vote of Congress in June 1974. 
Thereafter, the US market was a part of the 
international free market. Due to lower prices i n 1976, the 
US sugar beet growers asked the Carter administration to 
increase import duties from$ 0.625 per 100 lb s . to$ 1.875 
per 100 lbs. President Carter refused to raise import 
duties or to impose import quotas. He proposed, instead, an 
effective International Sugar Agreement <ISA) to raise the 
world sugar price and to protect the American domestic price 
in May 1977 <26). The US was a participant in the 
International Sugar Organization <ISO) for the first time . 
To insure the survival of the US sugar industry, a price 
support program was introduced. Under the authority of the 
Food and Agricultural Act of 1977, price support loan rates 
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for the 1977 and 19 7 8 crops were$ 0 . 135 and$ 1.473 per 
lb., raw value. In 1979, the price support loan rate was 
$ 0.13 per lb. This program was suspended in 198 0 b ecau se 
of the high price in the world sugar market cau s ed by t he 
short crop in Cuba . In contrast with 1980, the world s ugar 
price fell back below the floor price of the ISA 1977 . To 
help domestic producers, the US under the Reagan 
administration imposed import fees and a modified i mpor t 
tariff . After the failure of the ISA 1977, the world sugar 
price continued to fall. The US governmen t issued 
Proclamations 4940 and 4941 to modify the import fees a nd t o 
establish a system of import quotas allocated on a c ountr y -
by-country basis <37>. 
2. The United Kingdom Market: The Commonwealth S ugar 
Agreement <CSA> 
This market was regulated by the CSA between 1951 and 
1974. The purpose of the CSA is to ensure the s upply of 
sugar to the United Kingdom and to maintain stable pri c e . 
Under the CSA, the export of sugar to the Commonwe a l t h 
market was subjected to two types of quota, i.e. , overa ll 
agreement quota <OAQ) and negotiated-price quota <NPQ> . The 
OAQ sets the maximum quantities of sugar to be imported into 
the United Kingdom. The NPQ equals a ppro x i mately t o t wo -
t hirds of the OAQ. Under thi s quota, the negoti a t ed pr ice 
is determined by the terms of a greement, but is su b ject t o 
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annual adjustments. The UK importers purchased the 
remaining one-third of OAQ the ruling world price. The 
major exporters to this market were Australia, Guyana and 
some countries in the West Indies. 
Since 1975, the CSA has been replaced by the Lom~ 
Convention. The UK became a member of the EEC . Thi s market 
has been regulated by the Common Agricultural Pol icy. 
3. jhe European Economic Community Market 
The EEC was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 
The original six signatories were Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. In Article 38 
of the Treaty, provision was made for a Common Agricultural 
Pol icy <CAP). Under the CAP, the EEC became a net exporte r 
in the world sugar market. Since 1973, the EEC has been 
enlarged by the Lom~ Convention. The number of members in 
the EEC has increased to ten by the entrance of Denmark, 
Ireland, United Kingdom and Greece. The EEC be came a net 
importer. However, the CAP has encouraged the EEC to be 
more self-sufficient and become a net exporter later. 
4 . .'.fhe Sugar Export fr:.om Cuba to the C~J:J._tral_.l__y_ Pl .~D~_g_ 
Economie s: The Comecon Group 
Cuba has an agreement to export sugar to the centra ll y 
planed countries in Europe and Asia. Before 1960, the US 
market was the major market for Cuba. Si n c e the suspensi on 
of Cuban export to the US in 1960, the agreement wi t h 
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ce ntral ly planned countries became necessary to compensate 
for the US market. New quantities and prices are announced 
from time to time following negotiations o n a bi lateral 
basis . ·However, more than half of this imported s ugar was 
re-exported to the free market" <45) . 
The Free Marke t 
Sugar traded internationally is pro duced from sugar 
cane and sugar beet which are tropi c al and temperate pl a nt s . 
Hence sugar can be produc ed by almost every country. The 
movement toward more self - suff iciency has increased world 
s ugar production. However, the fr ee ma rket has been treated 
as a residual market . When t here i s overproduction , the 
surplu s of sugar from dome stic co n sumption is dumped on t he 
free market. When dome st ic production is short, the defi cit 
is b ought from the free market for consumption . Therefore, 
a ny changes in dome stic market condit ion s in ma jor exporter 
a nd importer countrie s will a ffe ct the structure of t h e free 
market. 
Both sugar cane and s ugar bee t take time to adj ust to 
c h a nge s in wor ld market condit io n s . The investment deci sion 
has to b e ma de before the marke t i s known . Sugar cane i s 
produced on a mono-culture basis. The cultivation of cane 
is done by the ratooning practice. Young shoots of cane are 
use d in the growing period. After gro wing fr om one to two 
8 
years, sugar cane can be harvested every one or two years. 
It is possible to do the ratoon practice for over twenty 
years. However, the yield declines as the ratoon get older 
so that it becomes necessary to replant in a certain period 
of time. Therefore, it has the drawback of occupying the 
soil. As it needs no land preparation and planting, 
ratooning also reduces production cost relative to the 
virgin crop. Unlike sugar cane, sugar beet is an annual 
rotational crop. Beet can be harvested usually not more 
than eight months after sowing <14). Hence, it can respond 
more flexibly to market condition than sugar cane. 
These characteristics of sugar and the free market make 
the free market price unstable and widely fluctuating. 
Both exporting and importing countries have recognized 
the instability of sugar market. There have been many 
international agreements in the history of the world sugar 
since the World War II, viz., the International Sugar 
Agreements <ISA> of 1953, 1958, 1968 and 1977. According to 
the ISAs of 1968 and 1977, •the main objectives of the 
agreement is to stabilize conditions in the international 
trade of sugar at a price level which would be reasonable to 
both producers and consumers by promoting equ i librium 
between supply and demand• <45). The means for stab i lizing 
price include of holding buffer stocks, multilateral 
contracts and export restriction schemes. This study is 
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focused on the effect of using buf fer stocks as a 
stabilizing mea s ure. 
Under these agreements, a sugar council has been 
established. This council allots export quotas that vary 
according to market tendencies and let the market price 
fluctuate between upper and lower limits. During ISA 1953, 
price was fixed at a ceiling of$ 0.0435 per lb. and a f l oor 
of $ 0.0325 per lb. However, the Suez crisis pushed price 
up above ceiling price in 1956-1957 (26). 
The second international sugar agreement, ISA 1958, is 
the same as ISA 1953 except for the modification of the 
allotment of sugar quotas for a three-year period and re -
negotiation thereafter. During this three-year period, the 
market faced structural difficulties when sugar was used as 
a political weapon. At the time of re-negotiation, it was 
found impossible to reach any agreement and the ISA 1958 was 
suspended on December 31, 1961 <26). 
Up to 1967, as a result of increasing pressure on the 
sugar industry caused by research and development of 
substitute sweeteners in consuming countries, there was an 
increase of the stock consumption ratio from 22.0 percent in 
1964 to 33.0 percent in 1968 <26). The third ISA was 
negotiated to cover the 1968-1973 period. Basic export 
tonnages were allocated by the I SO to export countries. The 
price level limits were set at$ 0.0325 per lb . and$ 0.0525 
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per lb. Responding to lower world price 1965 to 1968, the 
world consuming countries abandoned sugar substitutes and 
imported from the free market <26) . A rise in price was 
caused by the 1971 bad cane and beet harvest in Cuba and the 
USSR <12) . The world sugar price rose about 400 percen t 
between 1969 and 1973. 
The rise in price induced world sugar production to 
increase in 1976-1977 which in turn lowered price in the 
free market below sugar production cost in many sugar 
producing countries (5) . This stagnation in the sugar 
market called forth a new international agreement on Oct ober 
7 , 1977 (26). Under this ISA 1977 export quotas and a 
system of buffer stocks are the tools for stabilizing the 
marke t . The Basic Export Tonnage <BET) was designed to keep 
price level between$ 0.11 and $0.15 per lb . The buffe r 
s tocks were to be the second line of defense as they were 
built up only when export quotas were in force (26). The se 
s tocks were intended to be released when the prices were 
between$ 0.19 and $0 . 21 per lb. A third of these stocks 
would be released for each increasing in price by$ O.Ol. 
This ISA 1977 could not achieve its objective of 
stabilizing world sugar price. Sugar price rose gradually 
from below floor pri ce to above ceiling price in 1980. This 
was a result from an increase of purchases by the USSR and 
China a nd a s hort crop in Cuba. By autumn 1981, the 
situation reversed. 
price (11). 
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The sugar price fell below the floor 
Smith has pointed out the weakness of the ISA 1977 as 
follows (34) . Firstly, the allocation of "basic export 
tonnage" did not match the real demand level in the world. 
The formula adopted led to an increase in export quota in 
latter years. In 1982, the exports were limited to about 17 
million metric tons compared to their share of the free 
market of only 12.5 million metric tons. Secondly, the size 
of the stock at 2.5 million metr ic tons was too small for 
successful stabilization. ISA 1977 provided for regular 
inspection of stocks but in practice relied upon information 
supplied by exporters. Thirdly, the EEC failed to 
parti ci pate in the agreement; it wanted an agreement based 
on export quotas . The EEC proposed to undertake the 
parallel measures on its exports. However, the EEC 
continued by its subsidy policies to dump its surplus on the 
free market. The EEC share of the free market rose from 8.3 
percent in 1976 to 27.0 percent in 1981. The ISA 1977 was 
extended a further two years, with export quotas frozen at 
the 1982 levels. 
In the long history of the sugar trade, the structure 
of the international sugar market has been influenced by 
changes in both political and economi c policies. Thi s st udy 
attempts to work out a proposal of the EEC for an 
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Table 1. 1 . Major exporters in the free market 
<Sugar Year Book <20)) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
Australia 2621 2965 2002 2003 
Brazi l 1252 2487 1925 1942 
Cuba 1380 1483 2006 2057 
Dominican Rep. 999 1 1 1 7 9 37 1035 
EEC 1205 2 36 1 3341 3433 
Philippines 15 1 4 2575 1142 1158 
So uth Africa 809 13 25 718 724 
Thai 1 a n d 11 45 1675 1029 1210 
Su b total 10925 15988 13 100 13562 
To tal Export to 
Free Market 15550 20748 17 442 18270 
Perc entage of 
Free Market 70 77 75 7 4 
198 0 
-~---.. ·-·---· .... ·-·-· 
2410 
2662 
2189 
792 
423 3 
1793 
785 
374 
·---.. -
152 38 
19417 
79 
international agreement based entirely o n buffer stock s . 
There are many rules to operate buffer stocks , this st udy 
adopts the concept of optimal stabilization rule, optima lit y 
defined by its effect on export earnings. The study is 
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focused only on the ma jor exporters in the free market as 
shown in Table 1.1. 
Review of Related Literatures o n international sugar market 
There is much research on the international sugar 
market. Bates (1) used a spatial-equilibrium approach to 
modelling the sugar market. He designed the model to test 
the effect of alternative policies. Four years later, 
Sturrock (36) made a formal calcu lation of the desirable 
size of UK's sugar industry. Snape (35) attempted to find 
the effect on world consumption and trade if sugar had been 
available at world free market price levels. 
Important recent work has been done by Gemmill, Falcon-
Daiz and De Vries. Gemmill <10) estimated demand and supply 
functions for sugar for about 75 consum ing countries and 68 
producing countr ies. By using the concepts of producer and 
consumer surplus, he found that the world would gain from 
free trade in sugar. 
an effective cartel 
He also indicated the impossibility of 
in world sugar because of the highly 
elastic supply of sugar in major importing countries. 
Falcon-Da iz (4) extended Gemmill's wo rk by presenting a 
general equilibrium analysis of the world sugar market. The 
world sugar market was disaggregated into nine major 
regions. This study was a lso focused on a spatial price 
equilibrium model by using linear programming for 
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co mparative static analysis. Falcon-Daiz found the sa me 
result as Gemmill . De Vries (3b) used an econometric model 
to examine the growth pattern of the world sugar during n e xt 
decade. The result was that the net importing devel o p ing 
countries were the major factor of consumption growth. 
Consumption in other country groups was approaching 
saturation levels. It was also found that the prosperi ty of 
world economy had a greater impact on the wo rld sugar 
economy. A lower rate of income growth led to lower the 
price and the volume in world trade of sugar. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The issue of co mmod ity price stabilization was first 
discu ssed by Waugh in 1944 (46). Mo st work has been focused 
on t he analysis of the effect of complete price 
stabilization using buffer stocks. The basic model is the 
Waugh-Oi-Massell model. Waugh showed that with a downward 
s loping demand curve co n sumers, as price takers, could 
increase their welfare in the presence of price instabilit y. 
Accordingly, consumers lose from price stabilization. Oi 
demonstrated that firms as price takers in competitive 
markets with upward sloping supply curves also gain from 
price instability <30). These two studies consi der the 
effect of price stabilization only on one side of the market 
and ignore the other side . Massell C25) developed this 
further by integrating these two analyses. Both producers 
and consu mers are taken into considerati on simultaneously. 
The total effect of price instabi l ity makes both groups 
worse off. Price stabilization can raise the net welfare of 
society. Severa l years later, Turnovsky (40) showed that 
social welfare loss would be increased when the market is 
not in long-run equilibrium. He recommended that the 
government s hould take some action along the transition 
path, or otherwi se the equilibriu m would never be reached. 
16 
Besides the welfare aspect of price stabilization, the 
effect of price stabilization on earning instability have 
been investigated. Hallwood (16) indicated that the 
commodity price boom during 1972-1974 was the result of 
price instability. The i mporting countries suffered from 
this high commodity pri ce level by an increase of import 
expenditure and balance of payments problems. 
From the expor ting countries' viewpoint, the 
instability in export earn ing can affect the l eve l of GNP 
through the foreign trade multiplier and accelerator 
mechanism. Many authors found that export earning 
instability had a negative effect upon the rate of economic 
growth, the rate of growth of exports and the investment-GNP 
ratio. Moreover, such export earning instability is 
believed to contribute to the balance of payment problem of 
exporting countries. 
desirable. 
Hence, price stabilization is 
There is some doubt about the effect of price 
stabilization on earning stability. Much attention ha s been 
paid to the fact that price stabilization will not 
necessarily stabilize earnings and may eve n likely 
destabilize it. The effect of price stabilization on the 
stability of export earnings depends on the source of pri c e 
instability . Nguyen (28) and Turnovsky <41) demonstrated 
that price stabilization could stabilize earnings when 
17 
shifts in demand were the cause of price instability . 
However, these analyses assumed complete price stabi lizati o n 
at a fixed average price . A price fixing scheme has been 
shown by Townsend <38) to fail to fix price with probab il ity 
one regardless of the price set and regardless of the 
initial level of stocks. Moreover, it has been recognized 
that, in practice, buffer stocks cannot stabilize price 
completely due to the lack of necessary i n formation and the 
existence of adjustment costs <42). Hence, buffer stocks 
can only partially stabilize price. 
There have been some arguments about partial price 
stabilization. Nguyen ( 29) and Turnovsky <42) studied price 
stabilization by allowing price to fluctuate about its own 
mean. Then the changes of carryover depend on the de viation 
from the me a n . Newbery and Stiglitz <27) analyzed this 
approach in term of Rothschild and S tiglitz' s conce pt o f 
mean-preserving spread. The y argued that pre v i o us work 
i mpli citly assumed a mean-price pre se rving decrease in price 
variability. In general the price at average supply is n ot 
always equal to the average price. They are equal when the 
s upply a nd demand schedules are in line a r form. The price 
at average supply may not equal average price if either 
su pply or dema nd schedules are non-linear . If price is 
stabi l ized at its mean, whi c h is not the price at average 
s upply, the buffer stocks would steadily accumulate or 
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decu•ulate over time . Therefore, lt aay be infeasible to 
aa l ntain the average price. Newbery and St l glitz <27> 
proposed the concept of Mean-quantity preserving decrease i n 
price dispersion. Under this concept, outputs are 
transferred into storage at a date at which price is low and 
out of storage at a date when price is high. This result 
causes a change in the probability distribution over pr i ces 
to be more concentrated than in the absence of buffer stock . 
Let 
P<t> = PCQ<t» 
be the price at date t when consu•ption is Qt, and let 
P 1 > P2 
The price stablllzation scheme generates a new price 
Fl g u re 1 . 1 . 
Pncr 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I ----1------
Q, Q,+6Q 
Q\untily 
Hean output preserving decrease ln varlablllty 
<Newbery and Stiglltz <27>> 
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distribution by transferring an amount 8Q between two time 
periods as 
Q(t) for t i= 1 ' 2 
Q ( t) = Q(t) + SQ for t = 
Q(t) - oQ for t = 2 
To i llustrate this effect graphically, Figure 1.1 shows how 
a mean output preserving spread works. The probability 
density functions of output and price are graphed on the 
horizontal and vertical axes. The price stabilization 
scheme shifts an amount SQ from periods 2 to 1. Then Q2 
will be less likely to occur, as well as Ql. At periods 
and 2, the available quantities be come Ql+oQ and Q2-8Q. 
However, the average supply is unaffected by this transfer. 
The distribution of prices can be derived from the 
distribution of supply via the demand curve. 
To use the mean output preserving spread for studying 
the partial price stabilization, a rule is needed for 
determining the amount of output to be transferred between 
periods of time. The optimal stockpiling rule used is due 
to Newbery and Stiglitz <27). This rule was first developed 
in 1958 by Gustafson <13). Optimal stockpiling is defined 
as the holding of so me quantities from current consumption 
such that expected welfare is maximized over time given the 
current state of the world. Gustaf s on treated grain 
stockpiling as an optima l inventory problem. Given a value 
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<welfare> f unction for grain, a storage cost and a discount 
rate, he specified the optimal storage rule by using a 
dynamic programming technique to maximize the expected 
welfare. Later in 1971, Samuelson (31) indicated that the 
competit ive storage rule for maximizing expected s ocial 
welfare was equivalent to the competitive arbitrage 
condition. He showed this equivalence by specifying an 
opti mal control problem. This approach was forgotten until 
the mid-1970s, and was re - awakened by the problem of 
stabilizing the international commodity markets. 
Recent contributions have been made by Gardner, Newbery 
and Stiglitz, and Wright and Williams. Gardner (8) studied 
the optimal stockpiling of grain using Gustafson's 
technique. He provided a reasonably elementary discussion . 
Newbery and Stiglitz <27) applied Samuelson's optimal 
control approach for maximizing expected social we lfare to 
derive the competitive arbitrage conditions intertemporally. 
These conditions are the competitive storage rule for 
maximizing expected social welfare over time. They also 
gave an intuitive discussion and application of the optimal 
storage rule. Wright and Williams (47) used the arbitrage 
conditions to find the characteristic of the storage rule 
under the assumed market conditions. 
The optimal storage rule approach ha s a d i fferen t 
economi c intuition from those proposed by Turnovsky <42) and 
2 1 
Nguyen <29). For optimal stockpiling, first, the objecti ve 
is clearly specified, then the models of demand and supply 
are included, and finally the storage rule is de t ermined. 
This storage rule has the carryov e r fu n ction , i ndicaLed b y 
Samuelson <31), as follows: 
1. When, because of a run of recent harvests 
·above normal·, the stock of available inventory 
is ·high·, one expects the carryover to be high: 
i . e . , f<x>, which is the carryover function, is an 
increasing function of x, which is the amount of 
commodity on hand. 
2. Each increment of inventory, additional to 
already high inventory, can be expected to be 
divided between abnormally high consumption today 
<high consumption and low price currently) and 
incremental carryover for higher future 
consumptions: i.e . , consumption, c(x) = x - f<x> 
and f(x) has the properties, 0 i f'(x) i 1, 
OS. c'(x) S. 1. 
3. When, because of a run of recent har vests 
"below normal·, available inventory, x, is below 
some critical level, one would expect c arryover to 
drop down to zero , s ince the price now will be t o o 
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high relative t o the pr ice expected for the next 
period. 
The optimal storage rule will be applied to stabilize 
price in the international s ugar market in this study. 
According to Newbery and St iglitz C27 ), the objective of the 
rul e is to maximize the flow of discou nted utility over 
ti me. This utility is a function of consumption and money 
expenditure for all other goods. The objective func tion is 
T 
E I 
t=O 
t 
8 CUCCCt),M(t) - k - STK<t))J 
which i s to be maximized over S TKCt) fort= 0,1,2 ... ,T 
subject to 
where u = 
C<t> = 
M<t> = 
k = 
8 = 
S TK<t> = 
e = 
STK(t) ~ 0 , XO, STK<T> given 
T t 
I 0 M<t> = WO given 
t=O 
Utility function 
Amount of s ugar co ns umed at t i me t 
Money expenditure on a ll other good s 
Annual unit storage cos t 
Pure preference di scount factor 
Amount carried over at time t. 
1/ (l+r) 
( l ) 
( 2) 
( 3 ) 
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r = Money rate of interest 
WO = Present value of wealth and future income 
receipts 
X<t> = Amount of sugar on hand 
= Q<t> + STK<t-1) 
Q(t) = Amount produced at time t (a random variable) 
With the first term of the summation separated : 
Maximize 
L = U<X<O> - STK<O>,M<O> - k-STK(Q)) 
T t 
+EI 8 U<X<t>+STK<t-1) - STK<t>,M<t) - k-STK<t>> 
t = 1 
Subject to 
T t 
WO - I e M<t> = 0 
t=o 
S TK<t> ~ 0 
(4) 
(5) 
( 6 ) 
Form Lagrangian function and differentiate with respect to 
MO and Ml and set them equal to zero. 
(7) 
o EU'CMI> - µ0 = 0 ( 8) 
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whereµ is the Lagrange multiplier. 
Then we obtain 
0U'CMO> = 8EUCM1> ( 9) 
Differentiate Lagrangian function with respect t o STK<O> 
-U'(CQ) - kU'<MO> + oEU'(Cl> ~ 0 
STK<O> ~ 0 
-U'CCO> - kU'<MO> + oEU'CCl> = 0 if STKO > 0 
Rearrange and divide through by -U'<MO) 
<U'CC0)/U'(m0)) + k ~ CoEU'<Cl> I U'CmO>> 
Substitute 0U'(m0) = oEU'(ml) , then 
CU'CCO) / U'CMQ)) + k ~ ce EU'CCO> I EU'(MQ)) 
STK(Q) ~ 0 
The competitive market price at time t is 
( 10) 
( 1 1 ) 
( 1 2) 
( 1 3) 
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P<t> = U,<C<t))/U,<M<t>> 
so that 
STK<O> l 0 
Assume that the consumer is price risk neutral. 
P<O) + k le EP(l) 
S<O> l 0 
( 1 4) 
Then 
( 15) 
Therefore, this rule is just the competitive market 
condition. Storage is desirable if the spot price plus 
storage cost is less than the expected discounted future 
price. Price will be driven up as storage rises until the 
market is in equilibrium that strict equality holds and 
STK<O> > 0 
These conditions hold for any successive dates in the 
competitive market. The conditions of price relationship 
into the future are 
EP<t> + k le EP<t+l) 
STK(t) ~ 0 
( 16) 
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If a storage rule follow s the same price relations as these 
conditions, it can be called a competitive storage rule. 
Gustafson (13), and Newbery and Stiglitz (27) sho wed 
how to find the optimum storage rule practically. They 
calculated an approximating storage function, 0(x), by using 
a certainty equivalent condition. 
Let demand and supply for export have the form of the 
estimated regression equations: 
P<t> = a(t) - aC(t) + u<t> 
Q(t) = b<t> + B<t> P<t> + v<t> 
The certainty equivalen t forms of these equations are 
P<t> = a(t) - a C(t) 
QCt> = b<t> + B< t>P<t> 
By the optimal storage rule: 
Let 
and 
where 
P<O> + k = eP<I> 
x<t> = Q(t) + 0<t-t) 
C<t> = x<t> - 0Ct> 
0( t) = Amount of stock held at time t. 
Note that 0<t> is a function of x<t>. 
Substitute <21) and (2 2> into (19) 
( l 7) 
( 18) 
( 1 9) 
<20) 
< 2 I ) 
(22) 
(23) 
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P<t> = a(t) - a x<t> + a0( t) (24) 
At t i me t + l , 
P<t+l) = a<t+l) - a C(t+l ) (25) 
Q( t +l) = b<t+l) + a< t+ l> P <t+l) (26) 
x<t+l) = Q(t+l> + 0( t ) ( 27) 
C<t+ l) = x<t+l> - 0< t+l) (28 ) 
S ubstitu te <26) , <27) a nd <28) into ( 25) 
P <t+ l> = a(t+l) - ab( ttl) -aB<t +l)P(ttl) - a0(t) + ~0(tt1) 
Therefore, 
P<t+l) = <a<t+l) - ab<t + l> - a0(t) + a0< t +1)) / (1+aa< t+ 1)) 
(29) 
Subst itute <24 ) and (29) into <2 1 ) 
a<t> - a x(t) + a0( t) + k 
= 0( a(t+ 1 ) - ab( t+ l) - a0( t) + a0< t+1)) / (1+aB<t+l)) 
Take the derivative with re s pect t o x(t ) 
1 - .a0< t> = e ct - a0c t+ l > a x<t+t>> a0< t > <30> 
ax<t> <t+aB< t+t >> a xct+l> a0 <t> ax<t> 
From ( 27) , take the deriva ti ve with respect to 0 t 
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.~x < t .+ 1) = 
a0Ct) 
Then equation <30) can be rewritten as 
80( t) = 
ax<t> 
1 
+ 0(t) Cl - a0Ct+1)) 
<l+aa<t+l>> ax<t+I> 
( 31) 
If the stock carried over from time t is all sold in 
the next period, 
a0<t+t> = o 
ax<t+l> 
and equation (31) is 
a0<t> = 
ax<t> l+~ 
1 +a(H t+ 1 > 
Let T(it) =Slope of storage function for carryover 
From <32) 
At t i me t + 1·, 
for consumption within the i+l period at 
ti me t 
T(ll) = 80(t) 
ox(t) 
.a0< t+ 1 > = 1 
ax<t+t> 1+ e<t+l><t - a0<t+2>> 
1+aa<t+2) ax<t+2) 
If all commodity carried over from time t+l is consumed 
within year t+2 
(32) 
(33) 
and 
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a0(t+l) = T(12) = 1 
ax<t+l> 1+ e<t+2) 
~0(t) 
ax<t> 
l+a~<t+l) 
= T(21) = . 1 
l+ 0(t) (l-TC12)) 
<l+aa<t+t>> 
Thus, in carrying over the commodity for n period ahead 
T(nl) = <34) 
1+ 0(t) (1-T(n-1,2)) 
ct+aa<t+l>> 
It can be seen that the slope of storage rule is not 
constant . When there is a surplus in the current year, the 
surplus will be carried over for next year. Moreover, if 
the size of surplus is so large that it cannot be all 
consumed with in the next year, some of this surplus ha s to 
be carried over to the year after and so on. Therefore, the 
slope of the storage rule is increasing as the surplus get 
larger. The storage rule can be thought of as a nonlinear 
increasing function of surplus. 
Gustafson (13), and Newbery and Stiglitz C27) showed 
that the optimal storage rule can be approximated by using a 
piecewise linear approximation. 
0C t+n-1) = T(nl><x<t> - x<n-1,t)) + 0(t+n-2><x<n-1, t )) <35 ) 
At time t as n = 
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0(t) = T(ll><x<t> - x<Ot)) + 0(t-1) 
where 
x<O> = Amount of commodity at whi ch positive storage 
begin at time t, 
Assume that 0(t-1> = 0 
0( t ) = T(ll><x< t> - x<Ot)) 
Next step i s to find x<Ot>. 
(36) 
(37) 
Since for an amount less than or equal to x<Ot) there 
is no storage at all, 0( t) = 0. 
From the competitive storage rule, at equilibrium 
P<t> + k = 0 EP<t+l) (38) 
Substitute <24 ) and ( 29) into (38) 
a<t> - ax<O> + k = 0 E<a<t+l> - ab<t + 1>+a0<t+1))/(1+aa< t+l)) 
x<O> = CaCt) + k - 0CEa< t+1) 
- aEb<t+l> + aE0<t +l) ) / (1 + aEa<t+l))) / a 
( 39) 
The expected value of the coefficients of demand and 
supply can be approximated by their own mean values. 
Therefore, 
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xO = (a(t) + k - &<a - ab+ aE0<t+l)) /( l+a~<t+l))) / a 
(40) 
The value of E0<t+l) depends on how the buffer stock agency 
evaluates the market in future. 
When x<t) > x<Ot), the optimal storage rule is in 
effect, otherwise, there is no carryover. All commodity 
produced is consumed in the cu rren t year. After the storage 
rule is in operation, if the quantity produced in t he next 
year plu s the amount carried over from t he curre nt year is 
not all consume d in the next year, there is some amount to 
be carried over to the year after. Since this case is 
equivalent to the case of holding stock for t wo years, the 
s econd case is considered. The storage rule in this case 
is, by using piecewise linear approximation, 
0Ct) = T( 2 1><x<t> - x<lt)) + 0(t)(x(lt)) 
where 
0(t)(x( lt)) = T(ll)( x(lt) - x<Ot)) 
( 4 l ) 
There are t wo co mpone nts in thi s storage rule. One of 
them is the storage ru l e to fulfill the next year's 
consumption . The other part is the storage carried over for 
consuming in the next two years . Thi s is a special case of 
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equation C38). It can be seen that there is one more 
parameter to be calculated, namely, xClt). 
xClt) is the point at which there is no carryover to 
the second year. Therefore, x<lt) is equal to x<Ot+l). 
Since x<Ot+1) is prospective, it cannot be observed now . 
From <22) x<t+l) = Q(t+1) + 0Ct) (42) 
Substitute <26) and <25) into <42) 
xCt+l) = b(t+l) + act+l)a(t+1) - aact+l)C(t+l) + 0(t) 
Substitute from (28) 
xCt+l) = bCt+l) + a<t+l)aCt+l) 
- aBCt+l>CxCt+l) - 0Ct+1)) + 0Ct) 
If x(t+l) = x<Ot+l), 0(t+l) = 0. Therefore, 
x<t+l) = bCt+l) + B<t+l)a(t+l) - aB<t+l)xCOt+l) + 0Ct) 
At time t, x<lt) = x<Ot+l) 
x<lt> = b<t+l> + B<t+l)a(t+l> - aB<t+l>xClt) + 0(t) C43) 
From C36) 0Ct+1) = TCll)(xClt) - xCOt)) 
S ubstitute into C41) 
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x<lt) = (b(t+l) + B<t+l)a(t+l) 
- T(11)x(0t)) / (1 + aG<t+l) - Tll) (44) 
It can be seen that 'x(lt) • depends not only on the market 
conditions at period t+l but also on 'x<Ot) • 
generally, 
x<it) = <b<t+i) + ~<t+i)a(t+i) 
- T(ii)x(Ot)) / (1 + aG<t+i) - T(ii)) 
More 
(45) 
After the optimal storage rule is applied, mean and 
variance of price and revenue from export of sugar will be 
computed . They will be compared with the mean and variance 
of price and revenue under the competitive regime. 
Actually, they can be compared with any other policies of 
price stabilization. 
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CHAPTER 3. ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Price of sugar in the free market has varied widely 
over time. Most alarming of all were the explosive price 
changes experienced in the early seventies which led to a 
historically high mark since 1974. This was the cause of 
major changes in the world sugar structure. The domestic 
market of major exporters and importers has been isolated 
from the trade in the free market. Most countries have 
tried to protect their domestic markets by selling and 
buying through the free market to attain internal market 
stability. The free market has been treated as a residual 
market. As a result, the variatlon of price in the free 
market has been greater than that of the regulated market. 
Falcon-Daiz compared the degree of this instability by 
calculating the variance of both the free market and two of 
the preferential markets between 1951 to 1979 (4). The 
calculations are shown in Table 3.1. The variations of 
price are calculated in term of both nominal and real 
prices. Column (1) shows the variance of nominal prices for 
each market . The variance of real prices are calculated in 
1978 constant dollar terms. The variability in terms of 
real prices are shown in column (2). 
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Table 3.1. Variance of free market and regulated marketa 
pri ces, 1951-1979 (in <US. ce nt / lb)2) 
-----···------· .. ·-
International us. Sugar Commonwealth 
Period Free Market Agreement Sugar Agreement 
--------
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 ) 
1951-59 .799 7.86 .013 .256 . 7 1 4 1. 643 
1960-69 3.936 36.43 .346 3 . 516 . 080 0.429 
19 70-74 92.060 150.79 67.842 86.325 3 . 3 60 1 . 68 2 
1974-79 25.424 165.25 2 1 . 4 2 48.439 
------
a Fa 1 con - Da i z , N . < 4 ) . 
Estimates of price variance of the free market exceeded 
the variability in the other two markets , especially i n the 
early seve nties in nominal terms. In real term, the 
variation of pri c es in the free market had a monotonically 
increasing fluctuation over time. It wa s a nticipa t ed, 
according to more optimistic analysis, that the more 
co mpetitive market emanating from structural c hange s a nd the 
comparative advantage of net exporting countries would 
i mpr ove their long run export prospects <2>. 
In this study, the improvement will be me asured in term 
of me an and variance of revenue of major exporting 
countrie s . First, an econometric model of the internati o nal 
free market will be constructed for major exporting 
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countries. After estimat i ng the coeffic i ents of the model, 
data will be simulated. A normally distributed variabil ity 
is then added to the simulated data. The price 
stab i lization policy, derived in Chapter 2, will be imposed 
to analyze its impacts on the newly generated data. 
Conditions before and after adoption of th i s policy will be 
compared . 
Some discussions on the econometric model construction 
will be done in this chapter. The data will be simulated 
and discussed. In conducting this study, data are collected 
from many sources. The major sources of data are as 
follows. 
1. Sugar Year Book provides data of production, 
consumption, quantity exports and imports by country or by 
group. 
2. IMF International F i nancial Statistics collects data 
of GDPs, exchange rates , GDP deflators and interest rates . 
3. CRS Commodity Year Book has a collection of world 
sugar prices at the New York Commodity Exchange. 
4. FAQ Trade Year Book provides some figures about 
export and import quantities and volumes. 
5. ILO Bulletin of Labor Statist i cs gives the data of 
sugar retail prices for each country. 
6. UNCTAD Trade and Development Board collects the data 
o f storage cost in 1975 
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Using the se data collections, the study constructs an 
econometric model for production, consumption, and demand 
for export of these major exporting countries. The sugar 
yielded from cane is first considered. Since the yield 
decreases as the number of years in using the ratoon 
increases, the virgin ratoon is in practice used for three 
year on the average. The model for sugar produced from 
sugar cane is constructed as follows . 
where 
* Q c(t)= a - bPe<t> <46) 
* Q c(t) = Desired level of sugar production from 
cane in year t. It is assumed to follow 
a partial adjustment model as follows: 
* < Qc(t) - Qc(t-1) ) = T( Q c<t> - Qc<t-1> ) <47) 
0 ( T ( 1 
Pe(t) = Price expected by producers for time t. It 
is assumed to follow an adaptive expectation 
model: 
< Pe <t> - Pe<t-1) ) =a< P<t-1) - Pe<t-1) ) 
0 < 8 < 1 
(48) 
Qc(t) = Actua l sugar production from cane in million 
tons in year t. 
P<t> = Actual price in year t. 
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T = Adjustment coefficient of sugar production 
from cane . 
= Adjustment coefficient of price expectation. 
Supply of sugar from sugar cane from (46) can be 
rewritten as 
Qc(t) = al + a2QcCt-1> + a3PCt-1) + a4Qc<t-2> (49) 
Adding a time trend , T = t - 1900, the model becomes 
Qc(t) = al + a2Qc(t-1) + a3PCt-1) + a4Qc<t-2) + a5T (50) 
It is found that a2 and a3 are not significant even at the 
80 percent level. Hence they have been set equal to zero. 
The estimated model for supply of sugar from cane is 
Qc(t) = -45791.69 - 0.355Qc(t-2) +1068.462T (51) 
<0.25) (208.72) 
R2 = 0.913 
The figures in parentheses are the standard error of 
associated estimates. 
Sugar beet is another major source for sugar. Unlike 
sugar cane, beet is an annual crop. It can be harvested 
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only once from a planting. An econometric model of sugar 
produced from beet is constructed as 
Qs(t) = bl + b<t>Pe<t> (52) 
where 
Qs(t) = Amount of sugar produced from beet at time t. 
Pe<t> = Expected price at time t. This expectation is 
again assumed to follow an adaptive model as in 
(48) 
This model can be rewritten as 
* * * Qs(t) = b 1 + b 2PCt-1> + b 3QCt-1> (53) 
A time trend is also added to detect trend movement of the 
model. Hence, the supply of sugar from beet is 
* * * * Qs<t> = b 1 + b 2P<t-1> + b 3Q(t-1> + b 4T <54> 
where T = t - 1900 
The result of the regression from this model shows that b*2 
is not significantly different from zero at the 80 percent 
level. Discarding this term, the regression equation is 
Qs(t) = -9619.36 + 0.592Q<t-1> + 188.207T <55> 
(0.195) <83.51) 
R2 = 0.9526 
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It is noted that the wholesale prices of sugar are not 
available for either sugar from cane or from beet. For 
sugar cane, wholesale prices are estimated by using a 
weighted average of retail and export prices. The weights 
used are the amount of domestic consumption and export, 
respectively. For the supply of sugar from beet, the pr ice 
of sugar beet is used for estimation. After adding these 
two equations, the supply of sugar from major exporting 
countries can be estimated. 
In this study, the econometric model of consumption in 
major exporting countries is estimated. These countries all 
regulate the retail price of white sugar. Therefore, retail 
prices i n these countries are independent of the fluctuation 
of world prices, so that the internal consumption of these 
countries are independent of world prices . It follow s that 
the estimation of demand for consumption can be done using 
OLS . Nevertheless, data on retail prices are not available 
for some years under study. Data have to be pooled from 
time series and cross sections. Dummy variables are also 
included in the model to distinguish those countries fr o m 
o ne another. GLS estimation is used for estimating demand 
for consumption . The model is 
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Ci<t> = 36.367 - 75.053Pi<t> + 0.02Yi<t> + 20.02801 -
4.29702 + 5.01803 - 1.79804 - 27.8805 + 19.46906 
(56) 
R2 = 0.8902 
= 0,1, . .. ,6 
where 
Ci<t> = Per capita consumption of country i at time t 
Pi(t) = Retail price of white sugar divided by GDP 
deflater of each country 
Yi<t> = Per capita income deflated by GDP of 
country i at time t 
D1-D6 = Dummy variables for the Union of South Africa, 
Dominican Republic, Brazil, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Australia, respectively. When all 
of these variables are zero, the model represents 
per capita consumption of the EEC group. 
All of the coefficients in this model are significantly 
different from zero at the 95 percent level. This model 
represents per capita consumption of white sugar for seven 
major exporting countries. The Cuban per capita consumption 
is excluded from this regression because data on Cuban 
retail prices are not available. The estimation of Cuban 
consumption behavior is constructed by regressing total 
consumption on its own one period lag time. The Cuban total 
consumption regression is 
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Ccub(t) = 155 . 656 + 0.715Ccub<t-1) 
R2 = 0.6161 
(57) 
The coefficient of Ccub<t) is significantly different from 
zero at the 95 percent level. 
Production and consumption for all of these countries 
are both determined independently of the world price. After 
the amount of consumption is deducted from production, the 
amount left over will be div i ded between addition to stock 
and export. Demands for export and for stock are determined 
simultaneously. The stock equation is assumed to be a 
function of world price and a time trend. Concerning the 
demand for export, world price is a function of amount of 
export and income. Prices used in this model are ISA price 
divided by the GDP deflater of the OECD country group. 
Income used ls deflated GDP of the OECD group, which is used 
to represent the world income. A dummy variable is included 
in this model for the period 1962 - 1964 and 1974. This 
dummy is used to reflect some crises in the world sugar 
market . Between 1962 and 1964, there was a drop in 
production after the 1961 period of low prices and the low 
level of world stock relative to consumption . In 1974 there 
was a change in the world sugar market. The US Congress 
decided not to ratify the Sugar Act but instead to open the 
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American market to free sugar import. This caused a rise in 
world sugar imports and high prices. 
To estimate this simultaneous system, two-stage least 
squares is used. The model is 
STKCt> = 6717.16 + 46.49T - 15429.2PCt> C58> 
(35.48) (2198.1) 
R2 = 0.7584 
PCt> = -0.248 - 0.000034XPORCt> + 0.0000128YCt> +0.2200Ct> 
C0.00001) C0.000003) C0.035) 
R2 = 0.7840 
6 
XPORT<t> = Qc<t> + QsCt> + STKCt-1> - t Ci<t>-POPit 
i=O 
- Ccub<t> - STK<t> 
where STK<t> = Amount of stock at time t 
P<t> = Deflated world price of sugar at time t 
XPORT<t> = Amount of export at time t 
(59) 
(60) 
Y<t> = Deflated world income which is approximated 
by deflated GDP of OECD group 
DD<t> = Dummy variables wh i ch will take the value of 
1 for 1962-64 and 1974, and zero otherwise. 
Ci<t> = Per capita consumption of country i at time t 
POPiCt) = Population of country i at time t 
All coefficients in these regressions are significantly 
different from zero at the 95 percent level except for the 
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coefficient of variable T . The coefficient of T is 
significant at the 80 percent level. 
Combining these regressions together, a block recursive 
structure is obtained. Production and consumption are 
determined independently from the whole model . After adding 
production to the carryover from previous period, 
consumption is subtracted to yield the surplus for the 
current period. World price and stock are, therefore, 
determined simultaneously. 
The material balance in equation (60) represents the 
supply of export at time t. The coefficient of price in 
this equation comes from the consumption equation (48) and 
the stock equation <58). Since C<t> is the product of per 
capita consumption and population of each country, the 
coefficient of price in equation (60) is the coefficient of 
price equation (48) times the population plus the 
coefficient of price in equation <58). In this econometric 
model, the supply of export, unlike the demand for export, 
does not have a constant coefficient over time. 
These econometric models are used to simulate the 
production, consumption, stock held, export amount, 
international price, and revenue from exporting sugar of 
major exporting countries from 1962 to 1980. A compar is on 
between the original data and the simulated data is done to 
gauge the fitness of the model. The fitness of the 
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regression models can be measured by the R-Square of the 
associated model. All of the regression equations. except 
the Cuban demand for domestic consumption, can explain at 
least 75 percent of the variation of the original data. The 
model of Cuban demand for domestic consumption can explain 
60 percent of the variability of the original data. 
Graphical figures can show the fit between the original data 
and its associated simulation more clearly. Figure 3.1 
presents the data of the production of suga! model. The 
data plotted is the total of sugar produced from cane and 
beet. Total domestic consumption of major exporters is 
plotted in Figure 3.2. Consumption is increasing over time. 
There is a jump in consumption in 1973 due to member 
expansion of the EEC. The aggregate stock of sugar is shown 
in Figure 3.3. Stock of sugar has a sudden drop in 1974 
resulting from a high international price and a jump in 
domestic consumption. Figure 3 .4 shows the trend in the 
amount of sugar exported from these countries . The graph 
shows an upward trend. International sugar price is 
presented in Figure 3.5. The price shows irregular changes 
during 1972 and 1977. Within this period, there were a lot 
of changes in the structure of the world sugar market. 
Despite the increasing production of sweeteners from enzyme 
isomerization of maize, the poor crop i n Cuba and the USSR 
caused an upward trend of the price. Between 1973 and 1974, 
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the United Kingdom and the United States changed their sugar 
policies. Moreover, there was a wor ld sugar shortage in 
1974. This high price also sti mulated the production of 
sweetener from maize. However, during 1974 and 1975, bad 
weather that caused an adverse effect on beet cultivation in 
eastern and western Europe. The deficit caused by this bad 
cro p cou ld not immediately be co mpensated for by the 
tradit i ona l cane exporting countries . Since there were good 
weather conditions in Europe during 1975 and 1976 , the 
production of sugar beet increased so high that an excess of 
world production over consumption resulted. In 1977, the 
international sugar market was regulated by the 
In ternational S ugar Agreement 19 77. The revenue from 
exporting sugar of major exporters is plotted in Figure 3 .6. 
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Table 3.2. Market situation in the sugar free marketa 
Year Nominal Produc- Consump- Export Export Domestic 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
19 73 
197 4 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Mean 
S .D. 
Unit: 
Price ti on ti on Revenue Stock 
2.83 
8.34 
5.77 
2.08 
1 . 8 l 
1 • 9 2 
1. 90 
3.20 
3.68 
4.50 
7.27 
9.45 
29.66 
20.37 
11. 5 1 
8. 10 
7. 81 
9 .6 5 
16.83 
8. 10 
7 . 2 1 
18338 
18062 
2 1 t 0 I 
22932 
21437 
24067 
23860 
23638 
27277 
27738 
27307 
30616 
31227 
32497 
34961 
39678 
38182 
38 457 
36995 
28335.3 
6787.3 
10835 
11262 
1 1 336 
1210 3 
1 2 1 1 8 
1259 5 
13881 
13753 
14164 
14406 
14693 
19065 
20352 
18590 
20037 
19 253 
201 56 
21020 
21501 
9561 
7614 
8020 
9631 
9413 
1094 2 
1 107 2 
9889 
13196 
12 7 65 
14482 
13280 
126 38 
11 390 
13896 
19348 
16894 
17596 
17859 
27058 
63501 
46275 
20032 
17038 
21009 
2 1037 
3 1645 
48561 
57443 
105284 
125496 
37 4843 
232014 
159943 
1567 19 
13 1942 
169801 
300567 
7206 
6392 
8137 
9335 
9241 
9771 
8678 
8674 
8591 
9158 
7290 
5561 
3798 
6315 
7343 
8420 
9552 
9393 
7028 
-·-----·-··-·----------
15848.4 12604 .5 111063.5 7888.6 
3728.3 3329 . 3 99649.2 1537 . 5 
Price: cents per pound. 
Quantity: mill ion t ons . 
- -----------------------··----··--·-----·----···----·-.. - --.. -·- · 
a Interna t i o nal Sugar Organizati on <20 ) . 
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Table 3 . 3. Simulated data for the sugar f ree marketa 
.. --·-·-
Yea r Nominal Produc- Cons ump- Export Export Domestic 
Price ti on ti on Revenue Stock 
1962 7.50 16636.8 12179.1 76 19.2 57163 6102.51 
1963 9.92 17858 .6 12507.0 6298.1 62501 5155.99 
1964 9.06 20076.2 128 39.6 5 399. 1 48927 699 3 .48 
1965 3 . 81 21118.7 13077. 1 6901.2 26279 8133 . 91 
1966 3.43 21896.2 13315.4 8320.7 28517 8394.08 
1967 3.06 23143.4 13477.4 9431 .8 28848 8628 . 28 
1968 3 . 00 24515.7 13706.1 10692. 0 32026 8745 . 90 
1969 3.26 25739.6 13973.8 11760.5 38300 8751.14 
197 0 3.40 26930.0 14291.3 12575.0 42805 8814 . 79 
19 7 1 3.42 28179.5 14512.6 13558 .4 46376 8923. 2 1 
1972 3.89 29444.7 14817.5 14666.2 57 1 1 3 8884.18 
1973 7.67 30691.2 17507.3 14116.9 108301 7951. 10 
1974 19.56 31933.4 18969.6 15698.9 307214 5215 . 94 
1975 1 2 . 1 9 33183. 1 18063. 1 12917 . 8 157449 7418 . 04 
1976 10.42 34434.7 18394.7 15419.7 1607 38 8038.26 
1977 10.37 35684.0 18630 . 7 16843.7 174717 8247 . 85 
19 78 11 . 05 36 9 32 . 7 18860.2 1800 3 . 5 198892 8316.79 
1979 1 1. 1 7 38182.4 18701.5 19300 .9 215526 8496.75 
1980 11 . 2 4 39432.3 19196 . 3 200029.9 225066 8702 . 86 
·----·--· -------------------
Mean 7.76 28211.2 15632.6 22081.8 106 1 45. 1 7890.26 
S . D 4. 39 6831.9 2574.5 42128.0 83192.5 1157.49 
·---·----
Unit: 
Price: cents per pound. 
Quantity: mill ion tons. 
aEquation (51), <55), <56), <57), (58), (59) and ( 60 ). 
0 Production 
Source : Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 
Figure 3 . 1 . Production of sugar 
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Figure 3.4. Export of sugar 
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Figure 3.5 . No~\nal price of sugar 
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Figure 3.6. Export revenue from sugar 
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CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION AND RESULT 
The importance of the price instability problem has 
been known for a period of time . Previously, there was a 
consensus view that export instability was both harmful and 
particularly severe in developing countries. Most writers 
examined the effect of price instability on unstable export 
leading to the instability of investment and domestic 
income. In 1966, MacBean <24) argued that there was little 
relationship between the instability of export and domestic 
income. He also found that export instability did not 
impede the growth of the economies. Knudsen and Parnes (23) 
conducted an empirical test of the permanent income theory 
of consumption and investment in developing countries. They 
found that 
i) the average propensity to consume decrease s with 
higher level s of inco me instability, 
ii) investment is not harmed by instab ility but 
positively correlated with it, 
iii) instability is positively correlated with the gro wth 
of bot h GNP, and GNP per capita, 
iv) there is no relation between domestic and export 
instability. 
Re c ently, however, Newbery and Stiglitz (27) s h owed 
that it was not always the case that investment wa s 
62 
increased by price instability. It could happen but it was 
not clear whether there was a presumption that it would. 
It seems that the impacts of price instability cannot 
be predicted. While the controversies continue, the 
governments of many nations are interested in keeping pr ice s 
stable internally by using various policies. Johnson (21) 
indicated that the minimization of a nation's own need to 
adjust to price instability forced other nations to undergo 
relatively larger adjustments than would have been needed if 
all nations had participated on a more equal basis in the 
required resource adjustment. If a nation was successful in 
achieving price stability, price did not serve as the 
function influencing either production or consumption when 
world demand and supply changed. The adjustment to the 
variability must be made elsewhere in the world . The burden 
of these adjustments, in the recent period, fell primarily 
on the major exporters and low income importers. The 
international sugar market is one of the market on which 
affected by these policies. The issue of price instability 
in the international sugar market has been considered as a 
s erious one . The International Sugar Agreement<ISA) was 
form to stabilize international prices. However, these 
agreements, most of the time, could not limit fluctuations 
in the Interna tional Sugar Market . 
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In this chapter, the International Sugar Market under 
the i ntervention of the ISA is treated as a competit ive 
market . The data are generated from the econometr ic models 
of Chapter 3 . However, the internal regulation of d omestic 
prices is removed so that the dome stic market can fluctuate 
according to the changes in world pri ce. A normal 
distribution is generated for each es s ential variable, 
yielding an additive disturbance. 
The study is done in two phases. One of them i s 
generating data f or observation period, 1962 - 1980. The 
other is to generate data for a long period to examine the 
s teady - state distribution of some variables. 
Generating data in the observation period, di sturb a nce s 
are added to the major determinants of demand and supply o f 
expo rt of sugar. Those factors are world real income and 
domesti c production and income o f maj or exporting countries . 
Ta ble 4.2 s hows the simul ate d data after adding 
disturbances . Comparing to Table 4 . l, the prices under the 
model with disturbances added have higher mean and variance 
t han under the model without di s turbance s . 
To observe the effect o f price s tabilization i n lo n g 
run, some data are generated for 300 ob s ervations. The 
purpo se of these data generated is t o e xamine the effect on 
steady- s tate distribution and compares with t he theoretical 
effect di s cussed in Chapter 2. The purpose o f this meth o d 
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is not to predict the future market conditions. As can be 
seen later, even though the econometric model rather fi ts to 
the source data, the extrapolation for the future da ta by 
the linear models is quite explosive. However, these 
generated data show the effect of buffer stocks clearly. In 
o rder to avoid too much explosive of data, another 200 
observations are also generated. The se generated data are 
still explosive when it is compared with the observa tion 
period data. 
In imposing a buffer stock policy, it is assumed that 
the buffer stock agency does not have a perfect foresight. 
However, the agency is assumed t o know the means of 
intercept and slope of demand and supply equations. I t i s 
also assumed that the agency knows the average expor t le vel 
before imposing any policy. 
In Chapter 2, 'xO ' depends o n the expe cte d val ue of 
the storage level in the next period. The agenc y needs to 
forecast the market condition in the future. Under the 
assumption of imperfect foresight, the foreca st is a ssumed 
to be done by estimating a regression equati on for the 
in tercept of demand and the i ntercept and slope of suppl y of 
export. The se estimated equat ions are as fol l ows . 
A< t > = -1.2017 + 0.0242 T 
(0.283) 
R-SQUARE=0.77 
where 
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B<t> = -316.873 + 0.9898 BCt-1> 
(0.044) 
R-SQUARE=0.9696 
BB<t> = -7362.338 + 0.6017 BB<t-1> - 377.537 T 
C0.201> <192.54> 
R-SQUARE=0.96 
A<t> = Intercept of demand for export <59> at period t 
T = Time trend = t - 1900 
B<t> = Intercept of supply of export (60> at period t 
BB<t> = Slope of supply for export (60> at period t 
All these coefficients are signif i cant at least at the 90 
percent level. 
By using these regression equations to forecast the 
future conditions of the market given the informat i on up to 
the current period, the buffer stock agency can establish a 
buffer stock rule for each period of time. During the 
observation period, the storage rule is effective only in 
one period as shown i n Table 4.3. The mean of the real 
prices between with and without storage rule are the same. 
The variance of price decreases very little under the 
stabilization scheme and it i s not different significantly 
from without scheme . Even though the effect of price 
stabilizat i on on price is quite small, it shows some effect 
i n reducing prices in domestic consumption, stock and expor t 
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Table 4. l. Data bef ore add ing disturbancesa 
Year Produc- Dome stic 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Mean 
S.D . 
Unit: 
ti on Stock 
16636.8 7234 . 12 
17858.6 6899.5 2 
20076.2 8251.02 
21118.7 8904.51 
21896.2 8994.74 
23143.4 9113.58 
24515.7 9185.95 
25739.6 9205.22 
26930.0 9 273.29 
28 179.5 9361. 88 
29444.7 9 364.25 
30691.2 8902.86 
31933.4 7360.53 
33183.1 8973.13 
34434 . 7 9247.48 
35684.0 9 317.93 
36932.7 9345 .80 
38 18 2 .4 9412.59 
39432 . 3 9582.47 
28211.2 8838.47 
68 31 . 9 778.73 
Price: cents per pound. 
Quantity: million tons. 
Real Nominal Cons ump-
Price Price ti on 
0. 15 5.07 8644.8 
0. 18 6.07 8193.1 
0.09 4.84 10655.5 
0.05 I. 98 11927.8 
0.05 1 . 95 12209.9 
0.05 l. 83 12562.4 
0.04 1 . 8 3 1281 7 .0 
0.05 2.00 12995.7 
0 . 05 2.05 13313.4 
0.04 2 . 05 13601.0 
0.05 2.31 13756.8 
0.08 4 . 29 15014.8 
0. 18 I I . 08 13223.2 
0.08 5.39 15350.7 
0.07 4.73 16173.1 
0.06 4.96 16497.8 
0.06 5.44 16 7 16.4 
0.06 5.77 16870. 1 
0.06 5.54 17364.8 
0 .08 4. l 7 13573 .1 
0.04 2 . 28 2556. I 
Export 
10021.9 
10000 . I 
8069 . 2 
8537.4 
9596. 1 
10432. 2 
11626. 3 
127 2 4. 7 
13548.6 
14489.9 
15685.5 
16137. 8 
20252.5 
16219.7 
17987.2 
1911 5.7 
20188.4 
21245.5 
21897.6 
14619.8 
4448. 7 
aEquation (51), (55>, <56), <57), <58), (59) and <60) 
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Table 4.2. Data after adding disturbancesa 
!---------------- --·---------- -·------· 
Year Produc- Domestic 
ti on Stock 
1962 16099 .3 5684.41 
1963 27954.3 7501. 19 
1964 3056 l . 6 6859.77 
1965 15343.8 3200. 69 
1966 16365.5 3344.93 
1967 19724.5 4171.94 
1968 30815.8 7170.64 
1969 30129.3 5865.89 
1970 22962.2 5041 . 65 
1971 28028.6 7172 .00 
1972 37549.8 6548.39 
1973 43859 .0 7285.89 
197 4 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Mean 
S.D. 
Unit: 
36089.9 4495.17 
28321.9 4186.80 
35018.5 5284.80 
43867.2 6200.24 
47520.6 6650.70 
33109.0 5182.19 
3396 l . 7 4799 . 59 
30383.3 5612.99 
3552.62 1348. 78 
Price: cents per pound. 
Quantity: million tons. 
Real Nominal Consu mp- Export 
Price Price tion 
0.25 8.40 6116.9 13562.8 
0. 14 4.74 9201 . 4 16539.9 
0. 18 9.51 8262.3 22902.0 
0.42 l 5 . 5 1 1930.4 17070.9 
0.42 15.86 2109.3 14113.5 
0.37 14.38 3563.2 15334.9 
0. 18 7. 16 9085.2 18729.8 
0.26 11 . 26 6700.6 24733.8 
0.32 1 4 . 5 l 5179.0 18607.4 
0. 18 8.89 9320.2 16577.5 
0.23 1 l . 60 8156.7 30014.7 
0. 18 10.03 11235.9 31888.7 
0.37 22.42 6416.2 32464.5 
0.39 26.32 3795 .8 24833.9 
0.32 23.40 6 458. I 27463.0 
0.27 20.74 8727.0 34226 . 3 
o. 24 20. 13 9899.8 37168.5 
0.34 30.72 6 1 40. 1 28438.4 
0.37 36.53 5044.6 29300.0 
0.29 16 .43 6702.3 23915.2 
0.24 8.55 2648 . 3 7395 . 8 
a Eq u a t i on < 5 l ) , < 5 5 ) , < 5 6 ) , < 5 7 ) , < 5 8 ) , < 5 9 ) , < 6 0 ) 
and normal disturbances 
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Table 4. 3 . Situation under price stabilizationa 
-· 
Year Real Nominal Domestic Export Buffer 
Pr ice Price Stock Stock 
-· 
196 2 0.25 8.40 5684.41 13562.0 0 
196 3 0. 18 6. 1 7 6855 .41 18663.8 3098.54 
1964 0 . 15 7.81 7366 .2 1 20917.5 0 
1965 0.42 15.26 3304. 56 1793 . 0 0 
1966 0.42 15.81 3336.08 14156.8 0 
1967 0.36 14 .37 41 76. 22 15343 . 4 0 
1968 0. 18 7. 16 7171 . 50 18733.7 0 
1969 0 .26 1 1 . 2 6 5866.06 24733.8 0 
1970 0.32 1 4 . 5 1 5041.69 18607.6 0 
1971 0. 18 8 . 89 7172.0 1 16578 .0 0 
1972 0.23 11 . 60 6548.39 300 16 .8 0 
1973 0. 18 10 . 03 7285 .89 31885 .5 0 
1974 0.37 22 . 42 449 5 . 1 7 32 464.5 0 
1975 0. 39 26.32 41 86.80 24834.5 0 
1976 0.32 23. 40 5284 . 80 27462.3 0 
1977 0.27 20 .74 6200 .24 34224 . 7 0 
1978 0 .2 4 20. 13 6650.70 37170 . 3 0 
1979 0 . 34 30.72 5182. 19 28437 .4 0 
1980 0.37 36.53 4799.59 29299 . 7 0 
-·---· 
Mean o. 29 16.40 5612.53 23915.03 163. 08 
S. D. 0 . 09 8.53 1325.99 7395 . 69 7 10 . 85 
Unit : Price: c ent s per pound. 
Quantit y : million tons . 
·-
a Equati o n ( 34), <35), <40), <44), (58), (59) and <60) 
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of these major exporting countries . The means of export 
quantities and earning are not changed significantly . 
Generally , one objective of price stabilization is, 
besides reducing the price variability, to increase export 
revenue. In this respect, the data generated for the 
observation period do not show any improvement of buffer 
stock in term of mean and standard error on price and 
revenue from export for the exporting group. However, the 
effect of buffer stocks spills over for some subsequent 
period of time . It can be seen from Table 4.2 that the 
impact of holding buffer stock in 1963 decreases the 
variations of real price, domestic consumption, domestic 
stock, quantities exported and the revenue from export of 
sugar from 1963 to 1967. This indicates that buffer stock 
is a short run policy instrument that can be used for 
dampening any sudden changes in the market. Buffer stock is 
posit i ve for only one out of n i neteen periods. Moreover, 
there is some transferring of quantities held between the 
buffer stock and the domestic stock. While the buffer stock 
held is positive, the domestic stock is reduced by 645.65 
million tons from the pre-scheme situation. In the 
following period, the buffer stock is zero and the domest i c 
stock increases by 510 . 67 million tons. This contrast 
results from the reduction i n the variation of pr i ce by 
buffer stocks. 
70 
Another way to examine the effect of price 
stabilization using buffer stock is to generate data to 
study t he steady-state distribution. In this approach, 300 
o b servations are generated for real income of both import 
and export group; there are normally distributed. Moreover, 
since population is n ot normally distributed, the study 
assumes growth of population to be exponential. The data 
used are collected from the ILO Bulletin of Labor 
Statistics. The regression equations for the popula tion of 
the exporting group are estimated as follows. 
LOG<PPSAF) = 0.875 + 0.031 T 
(0.0004) 
R-SQUARE=0.9971 
LOGCPPDOM) = -0 .859 +0.033 T 
(0.0003) 
R-SQUARE=0.998 
LOG<PPBRA) = 2.557 + 0.028 T 
(0.005) 
R-SQUARE=0.995 
LOGCPPPHI) = 1.528 + 0.03 T 
(0.0005) 
R-SQUARE=0.994 
LOG<PPTHAI) = 1.536 + 0.029 T 
(0.0006) 
R-SQUARE=0 . 994 
LOG<PPAUS) = 1.332 + 0.017 T 
(0.0004) 
R-SQUARE=0.992 
(64) 
(65) 
(66) 
(67) 
(68) 
(69) 
where 
PPS AF = 
PP DOM = 
PP BRA = 
PPPHI = 
PPTHAI = 
PPAUS = 
PP EEC = 
T = 
7 1 
LOG<PPEEC> = 3 .419 + 0.027 T 
(0.003) 
R-SQUARE=0.8 3 1 
Population of the Union of South 
Population of Domin ican Republic 
Population of Brazil 
Population of Ph ili pp i ne s 
Populat ion of Thai 1 and 
Population of Australia 
Population of the EEC group 
Time trend = t - 1900. 
(70) 
Africa 
All of these coefficient s a re significance at the 99 percent 
1eve1 . 
The effects of pri ce stabilization can be examined by 
using univariate analysi s. By construction, produc tion of 
sugar ha s a normal di stri bu tion. Even though the demand for 
i mpor ts is linear, the supply of exports is not a l inear 
e quation . Since the slope of supply depends on th e value of 
population, the slope will change fr om observat i on to 
observation. The real price of sugar, pri or to impo sing t he 
stabilization policy, i s not d istri bu ted normally . The mean 
price is $ 0 .367 per lb . with standard deviation$ 0.158 per 
lb. The price has a rather high density around the high 
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price. The highest value of price is$ 0.494 per lb. The 
skewness coefficient of real price i s -0.62. After adopting 
a stabilization policy, the mean price decreases to$ 0 . 26 
per lb. with standard deviation$ 0.16 per lb. However, the 
skewness coefficient of real price under the buffer stock 
scheme reduces to a half of its value under the nonbuffer 
stock scheme. Price stabilization caused the distribution 
of real price to be bi-modal. The policy also moves some 
density from the high price and spreads the density over the 
other levels of price as shown in Figure 4.1. The plot of 
PISA <Price quoted by International Sugar Organization) is 
the plot of the generated data with zero buffer stocks. 
When the price stabilization policy is adopted, the density 
of real prices is changed to be the plot of B-PISA. 
The generated price without a buffer stock policy 
causes the domestic consumption of this major export group 
to have a quite uniform distribution. The mean of 
consumption is 181,690 million tons with standard deviati on 
113,301 million tons. The distribution of consumption is 
skewed with the skewness coefficient -0.005. While t he 
highest amount of consumption is 386,382 million tons, the 
lowest level is 2710 million tons. According to the change 
in t he di s tribution of price under a buffer stock scheme, 
the dome st ic consumption also changes it s distribution due 
to the assumption that domestic co ns umption depends on the 
0 PISA + 8-PISA 
PISA = Price under the International Sugar Organization. 
B-PISA = PISA ~~der the buffer stocks regl•e . 
Unlt: Cents per pound. 
Figure 4. I. rrequency distribution of prices 
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world price. The mean of domestic consumption rises to 
2,074,193 million tons and standard deviation increases to 
6,399,427 million tons. The distribution has a higher 
skewness coefficient of 4. 15. This high skewness 
coefficient of domestic consumption is the effect of buffer 
stock in lowering prices. The highest amount of consumption 
domestically increases to 39,830,034 million tons. Prior to 
adoption of a price stabilization policy, it is found that 
the mean of generated data for export is 22,352 million 
tons. The distribution of export is rather symmetric with 
the skewness coefficient 0.38 and standard deviation equal 
to 7,519 million tons. This distribution shows that there 
is no possibility of the major exporters becoming importers. 
Comparing with the export conditions under the buffer stock 
scheme, the mean shows that this group is becoming an 
importer of sugar at 1,870,165 million tons. The standard 
deviation has a change to 6,353, 110 million tons. 
highest amount of export is 156,709 million tons. 
The 
Thi s 
group changes its position to be an importer for about 60 
observation out of 300. However, c hanging their po s ition 
from exporters to importers tends to occur among the last 
100 observations. Possibly this results from the popul a t ion 
o f these countries increasing rapidly by the cons truction of 
the regression equation used in estima ting population. 
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This export group can gain even if the mean of their 
trade shows the imported position. Without buffer prices, 
the revenue from export of sugar in real term has a normal 
distribution. The mean of export earning from sugar is $ 
6022.41 million with standard deviation of s 3021 million. 
The buffer stock scheme makes these countries lose money 
from importing sugar with mean $199,992 million and standard 
deviation $769,040 million. 
The comparison of domestic stock is showed in Figure 
4.2. The domestic stock before applying of stabilization 
policy has mean at 11,805 million tons and standard 
deviation 2,299 million tons. Under the stabilization 
policy, the mean of domestic stock rises to 12,465 million 
tons with standard deviation 3,471 million tons. Moreover, 
the distribution is highly concentrated around the mean 
value. 
In applying the price stabilization policy, it is found 
that the optimal storage rule is in effect so that buffer 
stock is greater than zero only 41 out of 300 observations. 
The highest amount of stock holding is 54,030,092 million 
tons. The highest cost of buying for stock carried over is 
$ 10,493,630 million. The buffer stock is not self-
liquidating, in the sense that the average size of buffer 
stock will be constant over time <29). Eighty-six percent 
of the time, buffer stock is zero. The mean cost for buyi n g 
a Stocks + 8-Stock 
Stock = Domestic stock 
B-Stock = Stock under the buff er stock regime 
Unit: Million tons 
Figure 4.2. Frequency dlatrlbutlon of do•estlc stoc~ 
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sugar for buffer stock is$ 55,305 million wi th standard 
deviation$ 632,138 million. Therefore, the buffer stock 
agency will be losing money over time. 
It may be that the generated data for 300 observations 
is too many for the analysis of the effect of buffer stock. 
The data generated are reduced to 200 observations t o reduce 
the chance of having an explosion in population. In this 
case, the mean of real price declines to$ 0.23. The real 
price has the standard deviation $ 0 . 14 with skewness 
coefficient -0.14. It is found that the storage rule is 
greater than zero in only 16 periods. The buffer stock 
policy has little effect on the price distribution as shown 
in Figure 4.3. Howe ver, the spread of the density affected 
from price stabilization in smoothing the real price is not 
quite clear as in the case of 300 observations. In Figure 
4 . 3, the real prices are plotted against their frequency. 
The PI SA represents the real price before imposing the 
stabilization policy. The B-PISA represents the real price 
under the buffer stock regime. 
Consumption in the case of 200 observations i s quite 
spread out with mean 1 16,595 million to n s. The skewness 
coeff ic ient is 0.096 wi th standard deviation 76,534 million 
tons. With buffer stock, the mean of consumption is 131,041 
million tons with standard deviation 193,488 million tons. 
However, when the two highest prices are excluded, the mean 
PISA .,. 
B-PISA 
Unit: 
Figure 
0 PISA .f.. B-PISA 
Price under the International Sugar Organization 
• PISA under the buff er stock regime 
Cents per pound 
4.3. Frequency dJatrlbutlon of real prices 
<200 Observations> 
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of real price is 114,958 million tons compared with the mean 
of pre-scheme price of 115,232 million tons. In both cases, 
the means between the two regimes are not significantly 
different from each other at the 99 percent level. 
Therefore, the buffer stock does not affect the mean of 
consumption but does increase the variation of domestic 
consumption . 
Exports are quite normally distributed with mean 24,910 
million tons and standard deviation 7,279 million tons. In 
using buffer stocks, the mean export of this group is 10,463 
million tons and the standard deviation is 168,151 million 
tons. The buffer stock scheme also increases the chance for 
this exporting group to become an importer . Nevertheless, 
the possibility of becoming an importer is less than 5 
percent compared with 20 percent in the case ·of 300 
observations. This pattern of export makes the exporting 
group earn at mean$ 5,081 million tons and standard 
deviation $ 2,898 million tons. The distribution is quite 
symmetric with skewness coefficient -0.02 . The price 
stabilization policy decreases the export earning of this 
group to $ 3,759 million. The standard deviation reduces to 
$ 19,011 million. The stabilization policy, therefore, -
reduces the export earning and the var i ation of its export 
earning . 
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For the domestic stock, prior to the applying price 
stabilization policy, it ha s the distribution plotted by 
STOCK in Figure 4.4 . The domestic stock is distributed 
asymmetrically with mean 10,642 .9 million tons and standard 
deviation 1,771.59 million tons. The skewness coefficient 
is -2.24. The buffer stock affects the distribution of 
domestic stock as plotted by B-STOCK in Figure 4.4. The 
distribution is quite symmetric with mean 10,665.9 million 
tons and standard deviation 1,876 . 24 million tons. Even 
though the buffer stock added some more variation to the 
distribution of domesti c stock, the variances of the two 
distributions are not significantly differe nt from each 
other. Furthermore, if the highest amount of domes tic stock 
is excluded from the distribution, the value of mean is 
reduced to 10,629.56 million tons . 
Most of the time the buffer stock is at level zero . 
The buffer stock is positive for 16 out of 200 o bservations. 
The highest amount held is 726 ,330 million tons which is a 
quit e large amount of carryover. The buffer stock is not 
self-liquidating, where the amount of stock held is constant 
over ti me, with me an 6,027.81 mill ion tons and standard 
deviation 53, 194 . 9. In considering the money to buy this 
stock , the highest expenditure is$ 65,199.1 million. The 
mean of expenditure used is$ 1,034. 34 mill ion and standard 
deviation$ 6,670.47 million. Therefore, on the average , 
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about$ 1 1 000 million is the cost for controlling the market 
over time. 
0 Stocks + B-Stocks 
Stocks = Domestic stocks 
B-Stocks = Stocks under the buff er stock regime 
Figure 4.4. Frequency dl&tr~butlon of do•estic stock 
(200 Observations> 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND REMARKS 
In the long history of sugar trading, there have been a 
lot of changes in world market structure . Each period of 
changes caused a lot of adjustment in both exporting and 
importing countries. There have been some suggestions about 
the market intervention. The policies adopted in the 
earlier period were the export quota and price-band w idth. 
However, there was a lot of discussion and evidence of the 
failure of bandwidth price stabilization. The trend of 
suggestions moved to the operations of buffer stock. But 
there have been some controversies about the rule for 
operation. The price-bandwidth is still a major tool as a 
rule of operation. Recently, there has been a lot of 
research on the appropriate rule for operating the buffer 
stock scheme. The rule suggested here is one that imitates 
the intertemporal competitive market. 
The result of an optimal storage rule is a mean-output-
preserving decrease in the dispersion of price. The present 
study applies this storage rule to the international sugar 
market. The sugar trade splits into two maj or parts, the 
market traded under special agreements, and the residual of 
these special agreements. The latter market is sometimes 
also called the free market. The proport ion of each part 
changes in an unpredictable direction over time. The 
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proport ion of each part depends not only on economic 
conditions but also the political environment. 
To examine the effect of a buffer stock scheme, this 
study estimated some econometric models. The models are 
used to simulate the data for the observation periods. The 
simulated data are found to fit we ll with the associated 
actual data. The models are used to generate data by 
imposing the assumption that the domestic market is 
competitive. The data are first generated by using the 
actual data for the exogenous variables, namely, real income 
of b oth importing and exporting countries. To these 
variables are then added some stochastic values which are 
normally distributed. Furthermore, normally distributed 
stochastic values are also added to the production of sugar 
to simulate changes in weather. In generating for the 
observation periods, 19 periods, the storage rule is found 
effective only in one period in the observation periods. 
The range of price is reduced but by very little. The mean 
and variation of price and export earning do not change 
significantly. 
The next procedure adopted i s generating data for 300 
observations. Since the data used in this study are by 
year, the 300 observations is beyond t he observation period. 
Therefore, the data for these variables must be generated. 
There are two methods used to generate data in this study: 
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1) adding normal variables to the mean values, 
2) using econometric models and adding normal 
variables. 
The variables used in the first method are income of both 
importing and e xporting countries and the discount factor. 
The population of the exporting group is generated b y the 
second method . The data generated are used to examine the 
effect of buffer stock . The optimal storage rule is found 
to change the density of price . By this effect, the mean of 
real price decreases very little, with no change in standard 
deviation. 
The change in density of price also has an effect on 
consumption. Since the density at high level of price is 
reduced, domestic consumption increases substantially. 
Under the buffer stock scheme there is some probability for 
the exporting countries to become importers. This results 
from the shortcomings of the model constructed. The 
production and population of the exporting group are 
constructed to be increasing over time. For a long series 
of observations (300), the increasing rate of population is 
greater than the increasing rate of producti on . Whe n the 
distribution of price s hifts downward, consumption increases 
substantially so that the exporting group changes its 
position to be an importer. Th is situation arises i n the 
last 100 of 300 observations. To avoid this kind of 
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problem, another 200 observation is generated with the same 
methods of generation. It is found that the probability of 
being an importer decreases from 20 percent in the case of 
300 observations to less than 5 percent in the case of 200 
observations of generated data. The buffer stock is in 
action only in 16 out of 200 observat ions. The effect of 
the storage rule in transforming the price distribut ion is 
not as clear as in the case of 300 observations. However, 
the major results are quite the same in both cases. The 
optimal storage rule does not preserve the mean of the 
quantities exported . The dispersion of quantities exported 
increases by a substantial level. The storage rule affects 
the price distribution without any changes in the mean and 
dispersion of real price . Even though the export group is 
actually regulating its own domestic market by isolating it 
from the fluctuations in the rest of the world, the study 
assumes the domestic market perfectly absorbs the worl d 
price variations. The domestic consumption of this 
exporting group increases significantly under the buffer 
stock rule. It is also found that there is some probability 
for this group to be an importer if there is a high increase 
in population and low enough world price . In examining the 
d istri bution of domestic stock , the buffer stock scheme 
transforms the density to be more concentrated around the 
mean. There is some evidence showing the transferring of 
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quantities between domestic stock and buffer stock. The 
opti mal storage can be used as a short term pol icy . It has 
an effect on the behavior of the market in subsequent 
periods after it is in the active position. 
In considering the optimal storage rul e, the objective 
is to max i mize utility of consumption over time. It is 
necessary to consider the transfer between domestic s tock 
and buffer stock. Hallwood <15) indicates that the buffer 
stock influences not only the current price but also the 
speculator's expected price as well as the degree of 
c onf idence with which he holds h is price expectation. 
Therefore, it is poss i ble to reduce the size or the 
expenditure on bu ffer stock by taking into account the 
behavior of the stock held by the speculators . 
Furthermore, it is worth to remarking that the optimal 
storage rule needs perfect information . It is possi ble to 
store for the future but it seem to be physically impossible 
for the market to borrow from the future, as Wright and 
Williams indicated (47) . If the buffer stock agency knows 
about the glut of sugar in the future, the policy adopted in 
the present period may decrease the stock holding to 
discourage production in the future, to have room for the 
coming surplus of sugar and to find some funds for the 
incoming expenditure. However, without perfect foresight, 
the agency may mis-forecast market conditions in the future. 
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This may cause a greater price instability than the pre-
scheme. It may make the other variables in the market more 
unpredictable through the influence of price. It may end up 
with the need for big size of storage and a lot of fund used 
for buffer stock. 
In the process of generating data, as shown in Chapter 
4, for 200 and 300 observation of time series model seem 
explosively unrealistic. The econometric models were b uil t 
from 19 observations are used to generate about 200 and 300 
periods ahead . This procedure is quite the same as 
forecasting for the situation in 200- 300 periods in the 
future. Therefore, it is impossible for these mode ls to 
capture the reasonable structure for the distance forecast. 
Due to this problem, the level of both prod uction and 
population, which have positive trend, are rising to the 
explosively high level. However, this problem can b e 
avoided. The data can be generated by using the structural 
econometric models as done in Chapter 4. Instead of 
forecasting along the trend for 200-300 observations, the 
exogenous variables are the actual values in the observation 
periods. Then the disturbance parts are added to these 
variables. Using these variables with disturbances, the 
endogenous variables can be generated. In this procedure o f 
generating data, both exogenous and endogenous variable can 
be generated without any problem of the exploded in value o f 
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data. To generate some other more observations, for e~ample 
190 observations, 10 sets of d i sturbance parts can be 
generated and added to the observed value of exogenous 
variables, each set for the actual observed periods. By 
this alternative procedure the distribut i on of data can be 
obtained and studied without any explos i ve data problem. 
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APPENDIX. DATA OF MAJOR EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
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Table A.1. Price of sugar beeta 
(in national currency per 100 kg.) 
Year Be 1- Den- France West I re- Italy Nether- UK. 
gium mark Ger- land lands 
many 
1960 62.39 8 . 1 1 5.67 7.20 0.64 803 4.59 0.59 
1961 64.07 8.63 6. 13 7.20 0.64 904 4.99 0.60 
1962 88.42 10 .23 6.98 7.68 0 . 67 958 5.46 0.60 
1963 93. 12 9.64 7.24 7.54 0.69 872 5 . 93 0.65 
1964 79.64 9.74 6.71 8. 17 0.77 1079 6 . 93 0 .7 2 
1965 96.74 1 0. 18 5.92 7.55 0.78 1 171 7.01 0.63 
1966 90. 10 10. 8 1 6 . 52 7.62 0.83 1075 6 . 93 0.63 
1967 86.20 1 0. 1 8 6.40 7.54 0 . 82 1077 6 . 08 0.65 
1968 81 . 23 10.70 7 . 45 6.94 0.81 970 5.71 0.6 4 
1969 88.01 1 2. 2 1 8 .24 7.42 0.87 11 30 5.90 0.79 
1970 93.40 12.92 8 . 43 6.86 0.84 1 1 1 9 6.28 0.74 
1971 86.88 13.81 8.80 7.00 0.83 1381 6 . 95 0.78 
1972 93.34 15.63 9.85 7.21 0.77 1 1 4 1 7.30 0.84 
1973 99.08 13.82 9.42 7 . 32 0.74 1296 7. 17 0 . 69 
1974 116.22 15.93 11 . 38 8.04 1 . 10 2 116 9. o·o 1 . 0 1 
1975 120.54 1 7 . 6 1 12 .37 8 . 13 1. 58 2495 9.35 1. 37 
1976 130.63 19 . 87 12 . 34 8.67 1. 58 2571 8.34 1 . 1 5 
1977 133.49 20.50 14 .52 8. 2 1 2 . 00 2918 8.52 2. 19 
1978 1 4 1 . 30 22.43 16 .27 8.76 2.25 3947 8.87 2.37 
1979 123.40 23.90 17 . 72 8.86 2.65 4053 9.31 2. 41 
1980 133.34 27.26 22. 10 9.54 2 . 95 4969 10.50 2 . 50 
----
aFood and Agricultural Organization ( 7b) . 
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Table A.2. Export pricesa 
<Cents per pound) 
Year South Cuba Domini- Bra-
Africa can Rep. z i l 
1960 3.72 3.78 3.69 3.41 
1961 4.23 3.54 3.69 3.81 
1962 0.40 0.37 0.50 0.40 
1963 0.39 0.59 0.62 0.62 
1964 0 . 38 0.68 0.61 0.60 
1965 0.39 0.51 0.50 0 . 34 
1966 0.56 0.51 0.58 0.36 
1967 2. 41 4. 12 5.75 3.65 
1968 2.53 4.70 6.23 4.50 
1969 3. 13 4 .59 6.54 4.76 
1970 3.65 5. 18 6. 17 5. 11 
1971 5. 51 5.43 6. 35 4 . 56 
1972 6. 12 5.88 6.59 7.24 
1973 7 . 82 9 .23 8. 18 8.98 
1974 15.09 16.22 14.45 25.40 
1975 21 . 59 21. 05 26.84 28.57 
1976 12.01 17.32 11 . 88 11 . 6 2 
1977 8.83 14 . 45 9.02 0 . 85 
1978 1 2. 31 24.27 36.20 7.90 
1979 11.54 25 . 32 8.78 8.86 
1980 28 . 96 33.75 16.43 22.30 
Ph ili p- Thai -
pines land 
5.58 3.03 
5.75 3 . 94 
0.58 0.22 
0 . 44 0 . 50 
0.72 0 . 93 
0.59 0.25 
0.61 0.32 
6.54 3.42 
6.63 3.22 
6 . 84 6. 38 
6.99 3.66 
7.08 4.78 
7.82 10.65 
8. 47 9.40 
21. 7 4 18.88 
27. 15 21.47 
13.30 13.56 
9.52 10.05 
7.96 8.53 
8.36 8.97 
16.24 15.84 
aFood and Agricultural Organization <6>. 
Aus- EEC 
tra -
1 i a 
3.80 6.02 
4.37 5. 19 
0.40 0.59 
0.40 0.77 
0 . 70 0.98 
0.45 0.59 
0 .38 0.52 
3.04 4 . 70 
3.06 3 . 63 
3 .01 6.59 
4 . 18 5.07 
4.80 9 . 80 
5.58 9.28 
7 .03 12.35 
8.39 16. 5 1 
20.07 23.52 
16.32 16 .9 5 
13.05 14.38 
11 . 09 13.32 
12.57 14.22 
15.33 1 9 . 15 
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Table A.3. Production of sugar in the EECa 
(1000 Metric tons) 
Year Bel- Den- France West Greece Ire- Ita- Nether - UK. 
gium mark Ger- land ly lands 
many 
1960 513 342 2727 1956 133 996 710 982 
1961 454 216 1712 1439 3 127 975 586 840 
1962 348 209 1628 1488 25 138 997 457 757 
1963 367 373 2010 2062 36 145 917 418 816 
1964 574 426 2402 2134 67 142 1 136 650 1025 
1965 435 240 2344 1562 103 1 1 8 1238 597 936 
1966 421 836 1810 1913 1 15 1 1 1 136 1 573 935 
1967 579 329 1729 2060 120 144 1661 750 963 
1968 586 340 2380 1978 96 158 1296 720 974 
1969 687 304 2721 2019 146 1 49 1378 766 937 
1970 606 291 2804 2056 188 150 1202 713 984 
1971 852 324 3202 2343 155 188 1232 838 1 181 
1972 669 341 2984 2214 129 169 1280 756 964 
1973 787 368 3170 2453 158 192 11 49 832 1046 
1974 619 415 2947 2439 187 158 1012 778 622 
1975 722 423 3240 2·540 282 203 1442 914 70 1 
1976 663 416 2974 2733 382 189 1875 948 746 
1977 791 566 4268 3075 294 182 1359 904 1015 
1978 728 442 4065 2997 354 204 1620 1034 1 1 1 1 
1979 939 468 4332 3088 3 1 1 192 1707 915 1255 
1980 870 470 4253 2994 198 16 l 1932 951 1220 
ainternationa l Sugar Organization <20). 
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Table A.4 . Production of sugar in selected countr-iesa 
(1000 Metric tons) 
Year South Cuba Domini- Bra- Philip- Thai- Aus-
Africa can Rep. zil pines land tra-
1 i a 
1960 952 5861 l l l 2 3319 1398 140 144 l 
1961 1069 6767 873 3354 1530 150 1446 
1962 1031 4815 901 3238 155 1 1 5 1 1930 
1963 1267 3821 806 3037 1501 125 1799 
1964 1378 4590 825 3391 1733 168 2002 
1965 1014 6082 583 4614 1659 320 2073 
1966 1536 4867 691 3842 1443 269 2447 
1967 1732 6236 826 4275 1599 232 2389 
1968 1787 5315 666 4382 1612 188 2800 
1969 1498 5534 886 4174 1578 324 2269 
1970 1649 7559 1014 5019 1980 494 2507 
1971 1720 5950 11 32 5298 2171 640 2732 
1972 2 1 1 1 4688 1 173 6151 2099 70 1 2869 
1973 1953 5382 11 78 6937 2093 839 2583 
1974 1970 5926 1230 6931 2656 985 2938 
1975 196 8 6427 11 70 6299 267 2 1216 2930 
1976 21 1 3 6151 1287 7236 2984 1757 3395 
1977 2369 6953 1258 8759 2624 2 361 3452 
1978 2256 7662 1 199 7913 2728 1664 2978 
1979 2143 7800 1200 7362 2390 1981 2961 
1980 1780 6805 1013 8270 2332 777 3451 
alnternationa l Sugar Organization C20). 
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Table A.5. Gross domestic producta 
<Million of national currencies) 
Year South Domini- Bra- Philip- Thai- Aus- OECD 
Africa can Rep. zil pines land tralia 
1960 5335 723 2419 12380 54520 13840 1078820 
1961 5571 691 3499 13580 59090 14640 1156200 
1962 6027 876 6601 15620 83890 14970 1254360 
1963 6686 992 119 29 19050 69130 16230 1356290 
1964 7404 1091 23055 21200 73810 18020 1479400 
1965 7879 953 36818 23000 843000 19840 1610420 
1966 8555 1063 53724 25700 101290 20780 1759560 
1967 9459 1104 71485 28100 108220 22760 1881740 
1968 10203 116 2 99900 30300 116770 24030 2066480 
1969 11456 1325 131000 33800 128570 27050 2285800 
1970 12518 1488 206600 41400 135940 29890 2508910 
1971 14214 1667 276800 50120 144610 35204 2761580 
1972 15927 1987 363200 56070 1646 30 39070 3072800 
1973 19577 2345 498300 71790 216540 46490 3508300 
1974 24472 2931 719500 99640 271370 46690 3939840 
1975 27454 3599 1009400 114600 298820 67100 4342310 
1976 30908 3952 1560300 113930 337630 78670 4899420 
1977 34120 4587 248700 153970 393030 86630 5464070 
1978 39645 4728 376400 178210 469950 96190 6106940 
1979 47415 5490 631200 220480 556240 108770 6828070 
1980 61401 6625 1316400 266010 684930 123810 7596410 
aUnited Nations <44). 
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Table A.G. Gross domestic product of the EECa 
<Million of national currencies) 
Year Belgium Denmark France West 
Germany 
1960 566000 41100 296200 296600 
1961 601000 45620 319700 326600 
1962 643000 53190 366700 354900 
1963 693000 54700 411300 378000 
1964 777000 62530 456000 414600 
1965 842000 70250 489000 462000 
1966 907000 76800 513700 492100 
1967 971000 84500 573800 4969 0 0 
1968 1077050 92400 629300 540500 
1969 1196020 105600 722800 605700 
1970 1332790 116 8 00 807400 687000 
1971 1457620 128400 872400 754900 
1972 1626830 145430 98 1100 826000 
1973 1453690 164930 1114200 918600 
1974 2184180 193630 1278300 987100 
1975 2399580 216260 1452300 1034000 
1976 2725430 251210 1678000 11 22800 
1977 2963590 279310 1884600 1196100 
1978 3190450 311380 2 1 4 1 1 00 1285100 
1979 341 1350 346890 2 44 2300 1392500 
1980 3666690 373790 2769300 1481400 
aUnited Nations (44). 
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Table A.7 . Gross domestic product of the EEC <Continued)a 
<Million of national currencies) 
Year Italy Netherlands Ireland UK . 
1960 20994000 42350 641 n.a. 
1961 26222000 44690 689 n.a. 
1962 26222000 48130 7 44 28530 
1963 30072000 52230 799 30310 
1964 32925000 61460 909 32910 
1965 36610000 68710 974 35390 
1966 39558000 74930 1029 37750 
1967 43555000 8 2 280 1 1 2 1 42610 
1968 46953000 89810 1268 43240 
1969 51691000 101 7 10 1464 46230 
1970 57937000 114570 1641 50660 
1971 63056000 129650 1860 57010 
1972 69080000 1467 30 2223 6 3110 
1973 82503000 168110 2689 72250 
1974 110719000 109290 2946 82880 
1975 12537800 209 420 3680 10441 0 
1976 156657000 240170 4510 124290 
1977 19008 3 000 274930 5641 144790 
1978 222254000 297010 6683 166500 
1979 270198000 315960 7798 194470 
1980 338743000 336740 9188 227500 
aUnited Nations (44) . 
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Table A.8. Population of major export i ng countriesa 
<Million) 
Year South Cuba Domini- Bra- Philip- Thai- Aus-
Africa can Rep. zil pines land tra-
1 i a 
1960 15.8 6 . 79 3.0 65.7 27.5 25.5 10.3 
1961 16.3 6 . 94 3.2 71 . 9 28.3 27.2 10.6 
1962 16. 7 7.07 3.3 74.0 29.3 28.0 10.7 
1963 17.0 7.30 3.4 76.2 30.0 28.9 11. 0 
1964 17.8 7 . 70 3.6 80.2 3 1 . 1 29.7 1 1 . 2 
1965 18.3 7.80 3.7 82.5 32.0 30.6 11. 4 
1966 18.9 8.00 3.8 84.9 33 . 1 31. 9 11 . 6 
1967 19.6 8. 10 4.0 87.4 34. 1 32 . 8 11. 8 
1968 20.2 8.30 4. 1 89 . 9 35.2 33 . 6 12 . 0 
1969 20.9 8.40 4.2 92.5 36.4 34.4 12.3 
1970 22.0 8.60 4.4 95.3 37.5 35.2 12. 6 
1971 2 2. 1 8.70 4 . 5 98.0 38.9 36. 1 12.8 
1972 22.7 8.90 4 . 6 100 . 7 40 .2 37.0 13.0 
1973 23.4 9. 10 4.8 103.7 41 . 6 37.9 1 3. 1 
1974 24.0 9 .29 5.0 106.7 43.0 38.9 1 3. 3 
1975 25 . 5 9.30 5 . 2 108.4 43. 1 41. 9 13.6 
1976 25.4 9.70 5.3 11 2 . 9 43.5 43.5 13 . 9 
1977 26.9 9.60 5.5 1 1 6 . 1 46 . 6 43.8 14 . 0 
1978 27.7 9.73 5.7 119.5 48.0 45. 1 1 4. 2 
1979 28.5 9.67 5.8 119.5 48.0 45. 1 14. 2 
1980 29.3 9.73 6.0 122.3 49.2 47.0 14.5 
aFood and Agricultural Organization <7a). 
EEC 
170.8 7 
171.12 
173.34 
178.02 
180.03 
181.83 
183 . 33 
184.68 
185.71 
186.84 
188. 18 
189.47 
190.65 
255.93 
257.48 
258.60 
259 .50 
259.50 
259.80 
260 .33 
26 1. 25 
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Table A.9. Retail price of white sugar in EECa 
<National currencies per kg.) 
Year Be 1- Den- France West Ire- Italy 
gium mark Germany land 
1960 14.37 1 . 1 0 1 . 06 1. 14 0. 18 193 
1961 14.5 2 1. 13 1 . 1 0 1. 15 0. 19 194 
1962 14.80 1. 22 1 . 1 t 1. 17 0.20 203 
1963 15.08 1 . 29 1. 1 7 1. 20 0.20 219 
1964 15 . 8 2 1. 33 1 . 2 1 1. 23 0.21 230 
1965 14.65 1 . 66 1 . 2 1 1. 23 0 . 11 245 
1966 15.25 2.09 1. 21 1 . 25 0. 19 244 
1967 18.75 2.31 1 . 27 1. 25 0. 1 9 244 
1968 18 . 70 2.37 1 . 38 1 . 22 0 . 11 243 
1969 18.66 2 . 56 1. 39 1 . 2 1 0. 11 243 
1970 18.78 2.56 1 . 45 1. 18 0 . 1 1 245 
1971 18.00 2.61 1. 63 1. 23 0. 1 2 261 
1972 22.00 2.62 1. 6 7 1 . 28 0. 12 275 
1973 20.75 2.72 1. 72 1 . 31 0. 1 2 274 
1974 24.00 3. 16 1. 98 1. 43 0 . 14 388 
1975 27 . 50 3.51 2.51 1. 7 0 0.26 466 
1976 23.75 5. 51 2.63 1. 64 0.27 546 
1977 26.00 8.54 2.85 1. 66 0.31 610 
1978 25 . 75 8.94 3.08 1. 66 0.33 686 
1979 25.75 9.29 3.34 22 . 04 0.36 777 
1980 26.00 10. 1 7 3.81 1. 75 0.42 898 
ainternational Labor Organization <17) . 
Nether- UK. 
lands 
0.96 0.20 
0.98 0.20 
1. 01 0. 20 
1.05 0.20 
1 . 1 1 0 . 2 1 
1. 14 0. 17 
1. 1 7 0. 16 
1. 23 0. 17 
1. 27 0 . 1 7 
1. 12 0. 1 2 
1. 15 0. 18 
1. 20 0.09 
1. 28 0. 10 
1. 38 0. 1 1 
1. 48 0 . 16 
1. 61 0.25 
1. 66 0 .5 6 
1. 70 0.27 
1. 76 0 . 30 
1 . 79 0.33 
1. 89 0.39 
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Table A.10. Retail price of white sugara 
<National currencies per kg.) 
Year South Cuba Domini- Brazil Philip-
Africa can Rep. pines 
1960 11. 1 0.20 0.02 0.45 
1961 11. 3 0. 18 0.03 0.48 
1962 1 1 . 2 0.20 0.04 0.49 
1963 11. 4 0.22 0.07 0.55 
1964 11. 8 0. 15 0.23 0. 14 0.64 
1965 12.5 0.22 0. 21 0.56 
1966 13 . 0 0.22 0. 31 0.72 
1967 17.0 0. l 9 0.39 0.65 
1968 17.0 0.22 0.45 0 . 79 
1969 17. 3 0.21 0.56 0.89 
1970 17.2 0.21 0 . 65 0.99 
1971 18 . 0 0.22 0.96 1. 07 
1972 17.0 0.22 1. 06 l . 25 
1973 18.0 0.22 l. 20 1. 31 
1974 20.0 0.27 l. 53 1 . 7 1 
1975 16.0 0.34 2.01 1. 75 
1976 17.0 0 .31 3. 80 2.05 
1977 26.2 0. 15 0.37 5.29 2.25 
1978 36.7 0. 15 0.38 6. 48 2.33 
1979 39 .8 0.36 10.79 3 . 00 
1980 47.3 0.37 23.24 3.27 
ainternational Labor Organization <17). 
Thai- Aus-
land tra-
1 i a 
5. 19 0.24 
5 . 30 0 . 25 
5.50 0. 24 
5.45 o . 24 
5. 7 1 0 . 25 
5.75 0.21 
3.81 0. 20 
3.96 0.24 
4 . 68 0.24 
4.52 0.24 
3.33 o . 24 
3.33 o. 23 
4.52 o . 23 
4.50 0. 23 
4. 81 0.25 
5.07 0.25 
5. 35 0.28 
5.56 0.31 
6.25 0.34 
7.42 0.43 
8.00 0 . 48 
110 
Table A.11. Net export of sugara 
ClOOO Metric tons) 
Year South Cuba Domini- Bra- Philip- Thai- Aus- EEC 
Africa can Rep. zil pines land tra-
1 i a 
1960 284 5635 1099 855 1089 0 842 - 393 
1961 297 6414 793 745 1202 0 895 39 4 
1962 494 5131 846 479 1 l 47 40 1252 172 
1963 634 3521 671 487 1069 53 1219 -4 0 
1964 563 4176 662 266 1 1 1 7 49 1307 -120 
1965 301 5316 522 819 1100 86 1209 278 
1966 579 4435 572 1007 1086 55 1 5 1 1 168 
1967 816 5683 673 1001 1003 15 1848 -9 7 
1968 926 4613 625 1079 1007 0 2185 637 
1969 607 4799 636 1061 980 16 1530 260 
1970 689 6906 793 1 l 30 l l 78 52 1642 806 
1971 764 551 l l 0 1 1 1230 141 2 145 1762 930 
1972 1045 4140 l 1 4 1 2638 1262 439 2315 1502 
1973 914 479 7 1070 2975 1455 258 2124 - 313 
1974 826 5491 1054 2303 1636 537 1828 - 1037 
1975 743 5744 975 1730 1006 668 1976 -1 452 
1976 809 5764 999 1252 1515 1 l 45 2621 - 209 
1977 1325 6238 1 1 1 7 2487 2575 1675 2965 966 
1978 718 7231 937 1925 1142 1029 2002 1910 
1979 884 7269 1035 1942 1158 1210 2003 
1980 785 6 191 793 2662 179 3 375 2 4 I 1 
ainternational Sugar Organization C20). 
